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Abstract
In an environment where GPs are of differing quality and heterogeneous
patients have different preferences for quality, it is shown that fee-for-service
coupled with balance billing is a superior payment scheme to just fee-for-
service or capitation payments as it generates an efficient allocation of GPs
between high and low quality and an efficient allocation of patients between
GPs. Where patients have more than one condition it is shown that fee-
for-service allows patients to seek treatment from GPs of differing quality
conditional on the medical condition they have.
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1 Introduction
The basic problem faced by a government purchaser of primary health-care
is how to induce general practitioners to provide the welfare maximising
quantity and quality of health-care to patients. The difficulty is that the
quality of care is not observed by the purchaser and so general practitioner
(GP) payment schemes can not be made contingent on quality, they can only
be made contingent on observed quantity. However, quality of care might
be observed by patients. In fact, much of the literature assumes just this,
Glazer and McGuire (1993), Ellis (1998), Gravelle and Masiero (2000) and
Karlsson (2007). In the first two of these papers quality is known by patients,
in the last two papers the probability distribution of quality is known in a
first period and this probability is updated in a second period. Ma and
McGuire (1997) argue that because GPs have long-term relationships with
patients it is reasonable to assume that patients actually observe GP quality.
The fact that GP quality is observed by patients allows the purchaser
some leverage over quality through its choice of GP payment scheme. In the
papers by Ellis (1998), Gravelle and Masiero (2000), and Karlsson (2007), a
government purchaser chooses a capitation payment (a payment per regis-
tered patient) and GPs compete for patients through their choice of quality.1
The emphasis is on whether or not a capitation payment provides GPs with
the appropriate incentives for efficient quality choice. Patients in these pa-
pers value quality identically and differ by their location in geographic space.
Glazer and McGuire (1993) also have GPs competing for patients by
choosing quality. The purchaser pays GPs by fee-for-service. In addition to
1Strictly speaking Ellis (1998) is concerned with hospital payment schemes but the
analysis carries over to GPs. He also includes some cost reimbursement in the payment
scheme.
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this payment from the purchaser, GPs can balance bill by charging patients a
fee-for-service directly. They showed that allowing balance billing increases
welfare because it allows GPs to discriminate by offering a high quality
service to patients that are balanced billed and a low quality service to
patients that are not balance billed.
In this paper, patients are assumed to know GP quality but have different
preferences for quality. The emphasis is not on whether a payment scheme
induces GPs to choose the efficient quality but rather whether it induces
an efficient allocation of GPs between high and low quality and whether
it induces an efficient allocation of patients between GPs. To the authors
knowledge, allocation questions of this kind have not been addressed in the
GP payment scheme literature.
To analyse allocation issues a relatively simple model is developed. GPs,
are assumed to value income and the quality of the service they provide.
This quality of service can be either high or low and is chosen by GPs. The
total number of GPs is fixed. There is a fixed number of patients who value
quality differently and choose which GP to visit. Two payments schemes
are considered, fee-for-service and capitation. Under fee-for-service a gov-
ernment purchaser pays a fixed price for all GP services and also determines
whether GPs can balance bill.2. Under capitation, patients register with
a GP and receive all their primary health-care from the GP they register
with. The government purchaser pays GPs a fixed amount per-patient and
also determines whether GPs can charge a fee-for-service directly, that is,
2Balance billing was used in the US for Medicare patients in the early 1980’s and is
the current payment scheme in Australia, where GPs can ‘bulk bill’ patients (patients pay
zero and GPs receive a fixed payment from the government for each service delivered) or
can choose to not ‘bulk bill’ (patients pay a price greater than the fixed payment but get
reimbursed the amount of the fixed payment)
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balance bill.
The main result of this paper is that under fee-for-service allowing bal-
ance billing result in an efficient allocation of GPs between high and low
quality and also an efficient allocation of patients between GPs. This is
not possible without balance billing. Essentially, an optimally chosen pur-
chaser paid fee-for-service coupled with a patient paid fee-for-service, which
is determined by the forces of supply and demand, duplicates the outcome
of a competitive equilibrium. Patients who value quality more highly are
treated by high quality GPs and pay a fee for their services while patients
who value quality less highly are treated by low quality GPs and pay noth-
ing for their services. It is also shown that markets in which patients have
a stronger preference for high quality on average, have more high quality
GPs and more patients allocated to high quality GPs. In addition, it is
shown that where patients have one of two conditions, and one of these
conditions is such that the quality of the GP is unimportant, then patients
with a relatively high preference for quality choose to be treated by a low
quality GP for the condition for which quality is unimportant and for the
other condition they choose to be treated by a high quality GP and pay
an additional fee. In all of these cases fee-for-service with balance billing
maximises welfare.
Under payment by capitation it is shown that capitation and balance
billing yields the efficient allocation of GPs between high and low quality
and also the efficient allocation of patients between GPs if patients have
one condition. However, where patients have one of two conditions and for
one of those conditions quality is unimportant, then a capitation payment
can not yield the welfare maximum as the welfare maximum involves some
patients seeing high quality GPs for one condition and low quality GPs for
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the other. This is not possible under a capitation payment where patients
register with a particular GP and receive all their health-care from that GP.
Therefore, an optimally chosen fee-for-service coupled with balance billing
is a superior payment mechanism to capitation, even with balance billing, as
it allows the movement of patients between GPs depending on the condition
they have.
It should be noted that Glazer and McGuire (1993) demonstrate that
fee-for-service coupled with balance billing is superior to just fee-for-service.
This is similar to the main result of this paper. However, in their paper,
GPs offer a different quality of service to different patients while in this
paper GPs offer the same quality of service to all patients but some GPs are
high quality and others are low quality. In Australia, GPs tend to either
bulk bill all patients (no balance billing) or balance bill all patients. This is
consistent with GPs offering the same quality of service to all patients they
serve and not consistent with the model of Glazer and McGuire.
2 General Practitioners, Patients, and the Pur-
chaser under Fee-for-Service
2.1 GPs
GPs derive utility from income, y, and also the quality of the service they
provide. This quality of service can be either high quality, qH > 0, or low
quality, qL > 0. The utility function of a GP with preference parameter γ is
U(y; γ) = γ · qH + y. (1)
Providing a low quality service provides no utility to any GP. The preference
parameters γ is distributed on the interval γ ∈ (0, 1] with density t(γ) and
cumulative distribution T (γ). The total number of GPs is fixed at G¯.
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Under fee-for-service GPs get paid a price p for each service provided and
have a cost function which is an increasing convex function of the number
of services provided, n, and also depends on the quality of service. This
cost function is given by ci(n), i = H,L, where c
′
i(n) > 0, c
′′
i (n) > 0, and
c′H(n) > c
′
L(n). The last inequality states that marginal cost is greater for
the high quality service than the low quality service. Perhaps a high quality
service requires more GP time than a low quality service. GP income is
y = p · n− ci(n).
2.2 Patients
Patients are assumed to have Mussa and Rosen (1978) preferences, so a
patient with preference parameter θ obtains surplus
V = θ · qi − pp (2)
when purchasing a GP service of quality qi at a price of pp, and zero oth-
erwise. The individual preference parameter, θ > 0, is distributed on the
interval [θ, θ] with density f(θ) and cumulative distribution F (θ).
It is assumed that there are N¯ patients who have the same condition and
have unit demands for GP services. The number of patients with preference
parameter greater than θ is N(θ) = (1 − F (θ)) · N¯ . It is also assumed that
patients can observe GP quality.3
2.3 Purchaser
It is assumed that GP services are purchased on behalf of patients by a
government purchaser. The government purchaser pays the GP pg per-
3This assumption is standard in the literature in which GPs (Hospitals) compete for
patients through their choice of quality, Glazer and McGuire(1993), Ma and McGuire
(1997), Ellis (1998), Gravelle and Masiero (2000), and Karlsson (2007).
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service. Therefore, the price the GP receives is p = pp + pg. If pp = 0
the patient has complete insurance. The case where pg > 0 and pp > 0
is referred to as balance billing in the United States. In Australia, under
Medicare, pp > 0 is referred to as an out-of-pocket expense.
3 Welfare Maximum
As a point of comparison it is useful to solve for the welfare maximising
number of high and low quality GPs, GH and GL = G¯ −GH , respectively,
and the welfare maximising allocation of patients between these GPs, NH
and NL = N¯−NH . Let the inverse of N(θ) be θ(N), where θ
′(N) < 0. θ(N)
is the θ which has N patients with preference parameter greater than or
equal to θ. It can also be interpreted as the preference parameter of patient
N , where patients have been ordered from highest θ to lowest θ. Let the
NH patients with the highest θ
′s be allocated to high quality GPs, that is,
patients with preference parameters θ in [θ(NH), θ]. The remaining patients
are allocated to low quality GPs, that is, those patients with parameters θ
in [θ, θ(NH)). To minimise cost, patients are allocated between GPs of the
same quality type so that marginal costs are equalized. Given all GP’s have
the same cost function, the cost of serving Ni patients by Gi GPs of quality
i is ci(
Ni
Gi
) ·Gi.
Let GPs be ordered according to their preference parameter and let the
preference parameter of GP G be given by γ(G), where γ′(G) < 0. That
is, GPs with the highest preference parameters are ordered first. Welfare is
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given by,
W =
∫ NH
0
θ(N) · qH · dN − cH
(NH
GH
)
·GH
+
∫ N¯
NH
θ(N) · qL · dN − cL
(N¯ −NH
G¯−GH
)
· (G¯−GH)
+
∫ GH
0
γ(G) · qH · dG. (3)
Assumptions: The following assumptions are made to ensure the wel-
fare maximum involves all patients being served and that at least one patient
is served by a low quality GP and at least one is served by a high quality
GP.
θ · qL > c
′
L
(N¯
G¯
)
(4)
This states that the utility of the patient that values quality the lowest is
greater than the marginal cost of serving this patient if all GPs are low
quality.
θ · qH − c
′
H(1) > θ · qL − c
′
L(
N¯
G¯
) (5)
θ · qL − c
′
L(1) > θ · qH − c
′
H(
N¯
G¯
) (6)
(5) states that the marginal net benefit of treating one patient by a high
quality GP is greater than the marginal net benefit of treating all patients
with low quality GPs and (6) states that the marginal net benefit of treating
one patient by a low quality GP is greater than the marginal net benefit of
treating all patients with high quality GPs
Welfare is maximised by choosing the number of high quality GPs, GH ,
and the allocation of patients to high quality GPs, NH . Differentiating
welfare with respect to NH and GH yields the following first order conditions
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for a maximum
θ(NH) · (qH − qL) = c
′
H
(NH
GH
)
− c′L
(N¯ −NH
G¯−GH
)
(7)
and
c′L(·) ·
( N¯ −NH
G¯−GH
)
−cL
(N¯ −NH
G¯−GH
)
= c′H(·) ·
(NH
GH
)
−cH(·)+γ(GH ) ·qH . (8)
The second order conditions for a maximum are given in the Appendix and
hold by assumption. Let the solutions to these first order conditions be
unique and denoted by N∗H and G
∗
H . Patients with θ < θ(N
∗
H) are treated
by low quality GPs and patients with θ ≥ θ(N∗H) are treated by high quality
GPs.4 GPs with preference parameter γ ≥ γ(G∗H ) are high quality and GPs
with γ < γ(G∗H) are low quality.
Given G∗H , condition (7) allocates patients between GPs so that the ex-
tra marginal benefit of having a patient with preference parameter θ(N∗H)
treated by a high quality GP equals the extra marginal cost of doing so.
Similarly, given θ(N∗H), condition (8) allocates GPs between high and low
quality so that the marginal cost of having the GthH GP be low quality equals
the marginal cost of having this GP be high quality adjusted for the pref-
erence this GP has for delivering a high quality service. Essentially, G∗H
minimises the net cost of having N∗H patients being treated by high quality
GPs.
4Tirole (1988, p 96-97) provides a reinterpretation of the preferences given in (2) above,
where consumers have identical preferences but differ in their incomes. In this reinterpre-
tation, patients with higher incomes have lower marginal utilities of income and higher θ.
Therefore, in the welfare maximum, it is high income patients that are treated by high
quality GPs and low income patients that are treated by low quality GPs.
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4 Equilibrium under Fee-for-Service and Balance
Billing
In this section, the government purchaser sets the price pg. In addition to
receiving pg from the purchaser for each service provided, GPs can charge
an additional amount pp that the patients pays. In this case, GPs receive
p = pp+pg and patients pay pp. It is assumed that given pg, pp is determined
by the forces of competitive supply and demand.5
4.1 Equilibrium Determination of pp
In this subsection, equilibrium pp and the number of patients treated by high
quality GPs is determined for any given number of high quality GPs, GH .
NH patients demand the services of high quality GPs if θ(NH) · (qH − qL) =
pp. That is, if the N
th
H patient’s valuation of the higher quality service is
equal to the price he/she pays for it.
By assumption, high quality GPs operate in competitive markets and
take the price p = pp + pg as given. Therefore, they choose the number
of services to supply by equating price to marginal cost, that is pp + pg =
c′H(nH). Total supply is NH = nH · GH and so market supply is given
by pp + pg = c
′
H(
NH
GH
). Equating market demand and market supply and
rearranging yields
θ(NH) · (qH − qL) = c
′
H(
NH
GH
)− pg. (9)
5In Australia, in 2010, 75% of GP attendances were bulk billed, Medicare Australia
Statistics, 2010, Monthly and Quarterly Standard Reports. GPs tend to either bulk bill,
pp = 0, or balance bill, pp > 0, all patients. In addition, bulk billing and balance billing
GPs are often located in close geographic proximity. This suggests that balance billing
GPs are able to charge pp > 0 not because of monopoly power, but rather because the
market for high quality GPs is competitive and the service they offer is different to that
of low quality GPs.
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Condition (9) is solved for N˜H and p˜p = θ(N˜H) · (qH − qL). Patients with
preference parameters in [θ(N˜H), θ] choose the high quality service and pay
a premium of p˜p.
4.2 Determination of pg
In equilibrium, patients are allocated between GPs so that (9) is satisfied.
In addition, in equilibrium, GPs are allocated between low and high quality
so that the utility of the marginal GP is equal whether or not she chooses
low or high quality, that is,
pg · nL − cL(nL) = (pg + pp) · nH − cH(nH) + γ(GH) · qH . (10)
Using high quality GP market supply allows (10) to be rewritten as
pg · nL − cL(nL) = c
′
H(
NH
GH
) · (
NH
GH
)− cH(
NH
GH
) + γ(GH) · qH . (11)
Given pg and NL + NH = N¯ , (9) and (11) are solved simultaneously for
equilibrium NH and GH .
Proposition 1: If the government purchaser sets pg = c
′
L
( N¯−N∗
H
G¯−G∗
H
)
, then
market determination of pp yields the welfare maximising allocation of pa-
tients between GPs and the welfare maximising allocation of GPs between
high and low quality.
Proof: If pg = c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
)
, then profit maximisation yields nL =
N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
.
Substituting this into (11) above yields
c′L(·) ·
( N¯ −N∗H
G¯−G∗H
)
− cL(
N¯ −N∗H
G¯−G∗H
) = c′H(·) · (
NH
GH
)− cH(·)+γ(GH ) · qH . (12)
Given the uniqueness of the solution to (7) and (8) and the fact that all
patients are treated in the welfare maximum, the solution to (9) and (12) is
N∗H and G
∗
H . 
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Given G∗H , the solution for N
∗
H is shown in Figure 1. pg is chosen so that
N¯−N∗H patients are treated by low quality GPs. The remaining patients pay
pp = θ(N
∗
H)(qH−qL) and are treated by high quality GPs. By construction,
condition (9) is satisfied at N∗H .
Figure 1
Solution for N∗H
N¯N
∗
H
pg
pp
pg + pp
$
c′H c
′
H − pg
θ(N)(qH − qL)
c′L
The optimal government purchase price of pg = c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
)
when com-
bined with market determination of pp duplicates the outcome that would
arise if there were no government purchaser and the price paid to low quality
GPs was market determined, the difference being that patients would pay
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this price. Therefore, it is not surprising that balance billing leads to the
welfare maximising (efficient) allocation of patients to GPs and the welfare
maximisng (efficient) allocation of GPs between high and low quality.
5 Equilibrium under Fee-for-Service and No Bal-
ance Billing
In this section, it is assumed that patients make no payments, that is, pp = 0.
Let the price paid by the purchaser be denoted pnb. Define p
0
nb as the highest
price for which a high quality GP chooses nH = 0. Assume that piL(p
0
nb) >
γ(0) so that with p0nb all GPs choose to be low quality. That is, no GP
chooses to be high quality unless they earn positive income. For pnb > p
0
nb,
as long as low quality GPs are not rationed, piL(pnb) > piH(pnb) + γ(0)
because nL > nH . In this case all GPs choose to be low quality.
Define p1nb by piL(p
1
nb) = piH(p
1
nb) + γ(0), it is the lowest price at which
the GP with the highest γ chooses high quality. For pnb ≥ p
1
nb, at least one
GPs chooses high quality and low quality GPs are rationed. For pnb < p
1
nb
all GPs choose low quality.
Let sH(p) be the supply function of a high quality GP and let GH(p) be
a function that relates the number of high quality GPs to price. In addition,
let the expected value of θ be Eθ. The number of patients that see a low
quality GP is the residual N¯−sH(p)·(GH )
G¯−GH
. Expected welfare is given by
W = Eθ · qH · sH(p) ·GH(pnb)− cH(sH(p)) ·GH(pnb)
+ Eθ · qL ·
(
N¯ − sH(p) ·GH(pnb)
)
− cL
(
N¯ − sH(p) ·GH(pnb)
G¯−GH(pnb)
)
· (G¯−GH(pnb))
+
∫ GH (pnb)
0
γ(G) · qH · dG. (13)
The government purchaser chooses pnb to maximise welfare. Let the solution
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to this problem be given by p∗nb. This discussion is summarised in the
following propoition.
Proposition 2: (i) If p∗nb < p
1
nb, then all GPs choose low quality and
the welfare maximum of Section 3 is not achieved. (ii) If p∗nb ≥ p
1
nb, then
some GPs choose high quality and the welfare maximum of Section 3 is not
achieved because patients are allocated randomly to high and low quality GPs.
5.1 Single Price versus Balance Billing
Proposition 1 established that balance billing yields the efficient allocation
of patients to GPs and the efficient allocation of GPs between high and low
quality. This required two prices, one for high quality GPs, p∗g + pp, and
one for low quality GPs, p∗g. These two prices are essential in allocating
patients to GPs since with one price patients end up being allocated ran-
domly. This results in some patients who place a low value on a high quality
service being treated by high quality GPs. In addition, with one price, GPs
are allocated inefficiently between high and low quality as one instrument
can not attain two objectives. The above discussion is summarised in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3: Balance billing with pg = c
′
L
( N¯−N∗
H
G¯−G∗
H
)
and pp = θ(N
∗
H) ·
(qH − qL) yields more welfare than no balance billing.
Once again this is not surprising. Essentially there are two competitive
markets, the high and low quality market for GP services. Allowing two
prices where the low quality price is optimally chosen and the high quality
price is market determined is optimal as these two prices are able to allocate
GPs between high and low quality and patients to GPs in an efficient man-
ner. One price is unable to do this even if the allocation of GPs between
high and low quality is fixed at the welfare maximum.
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No Balance Billing: With no balance billing, if it is optimal to have some
high quality GPs, then low quality GPs are rationed and have an incentive
to over-service. This incentive is not present with balance billing as pg is
set at a level that induces low quality GPs to offer exactly the numbers of
services demanded from them. This is a further advantage balance billing
has over the optimal single price.
Balance Billing: With balance billing the choice of pg by the purchaser is
crucial. If pg < c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
)
, then less patients are treated by both high and
low quality GPs relative to the welfare maximum. Therefore, some patients,
those who do not value quality highly, are not treated. For these patients,
the benefit of treatment is greater than the marginal cost of being treated
by a low quality GP and so low quality GPs can charge price pLp to these
patients, where pLp is obtained from pg+p
L
p = c
′
L
( N¯−N∗
H
G¯−G∗
H
)
. In this case, both
high and low quality GPs balance bill with pp = θ(N
∗
H) · (qH − qL)+ p
L
p and
welfare is maximised.
The analysis is more complicated if pg > c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
)
. Totally differen-
tiating (9) and (11), applying Cramer’s Rule, and using the second order
conditions for a welfare maximum yields
sign
[∂NH
∂pg
]
= sign
[
c′′H(·) ·
(N∗H
G∗2H
·
(N∗H
G∗H
−
N¯ −N∗H
G¯−G∗H
))
− γ′(G∗H) · qH
]
(14)
and
sign
[∂GH
∂pg
]
= sign
[
θ′(N∗H)·(qH−qL)·
(N¯ −N∗H
G¯−G∗H
)
+
c′′H(·)
G∗H
·
(N∗H
G∗H
−
N¯ −N∗H
G¯−G∗H
)]
(15)
at N∗H , G
∗
H .
If
(
N∗
H
G∗
H
−
N¯−N∗
H
G¯−G∗
H
)
< 0, that is, at the welfare maximum, the number of
patients treated by low quality GPs is greater than the number treated by
high quality GPs, then ∂GH
∂pg
< 0 and there is an unambiguous excess supply
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of low quality services at pg > c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
)
. The intuition is clear, an increase
in pg increases the utility of being a low quality GP relative to being a high
quality GP as low quality GPs provide more services than high quality GPs.
Therefore, more GPs choose low quality. The number of patients is fixed,
so with more low quality GPs and a higher price for their services there is
an excess supply of low quality services and low quality GPs are rationed.
If
(
N∗
H
G∗
H
−
N¯−N∗
H
G¯−G∗
H
)
> 0, then ∂NH
∂pg
> 0 but the sign of ∂GH
∂pg
is ambiguous.
However, even if GH increases, there is an excess supply of low quality
services as the number of patients treated by low quality GPs is smaller
than the number treated by high quality GPs and low quality GPs are
rationed.
Therefore, if pg > c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H
G¯−G∗
H
)
low quality GPs are rationed. This ra-
tioning may lead to over-servicing by low quality GPs as patients face a
price of zero and low quality GPs want to provide more services than the
rationed amount. The choice of pg is therefore a crucial choice for the pur-
chaser.6
So far, the interpretation of pg is that it is the price a purchaser pays
to GPs for providing a service. It provides insurance to patients and at the
welfare maximum it provides complete insurance for those patients choos-
ing low quality GPs and partial insurance for those patients choosing high
quality. However, the model could be reinterpreted with patients paying pg
to obtain treatment from low quality GPs, or paying pg+pp to obtain treat-
ment from high quality GPs and then being reimbursed through insurance
an amount pi where pi = pg.
6Pauly (1991) argued that at the time US medicare prices for most services were greater
than marginal cost and this resulted in an excess supply for most medicare services.
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5.2 Local Markets
So far it has been assumed that there is only one market for GP services. It
is now assumed that there are many local markets which are differentiated
by having different distributions over patient preference parameters. This
differentiation is achieved by adding a parameter α into the function that
maps patients into θ, that is, θ(N ;α), where ∂θ
∂α
≥ 0. For a given N , the
greater is α, the greater is θ. Assuming N¯ is the same in all markets, the
interpretation of one market having a higher α than another is that in the
market with the higher α, the average patient has a stronger preference for
high quality than in the market with the lower α.7 Substituting θ(N ;α) for
θ(N) in the definition of welfare, (3), results in θ(NH) in first order condition
(7) being replaced by θ(NH ;α). Totally differentiating the new (7) and (8)
and applying Cramer’s rule yields
sign
[∂NH
∂α
]
= sign
[
−
∂θ
∂α
· (qH − ql) ·
(
−c′′H(·) ·
N2H
G3H
− c′′L(·)
(N¯ −NH)
2
(G¯−GH)3
+ γ′(GH)qH
)]
> 0 (16)
and
sign
[∂GH
∂α
]
= sign
[ ∂θ
∂α
· (qH − qL) ·
(
c′′H(·) ·
NH
G2H
+ c′′L(·)
(N¯ −NH)
(G¯ −GH)2
)]
> 0
(17)
The intuition is clear. In markets in which α is higher, patients have a
greater preference for high quality and so the welfare maximum involves
more patients being served by high quality GPs and more GPs of high
quality than in markets in which α is lower.
7It could be that interval from which θ is drawn is unchanged and the cumulative
distribution function associated with the higher α, J(θ), stochastically dominates F (θ),
or it could be that the interval from which θ is drawn has an upper bound which is greater
than θ.
16
Proposition 1 applies to all markets regardless of α, and so the welfare
maximum in each market can be achieved by the purchaser setting pg =
c′L
( N¯−N∗H (α)
G¯−G∗
H
(α)
)
and then letting the market determine pp. By assumption,
marginal cost is an increasing function and so
dpg
dα
has the same sign as
d
(N¯−N∗H (α))
(G¯−G∗
H
(α))
dα
. Now
d
(N¯−N∗H (α))
(G¯−G∗
H
(α))
dα
=
−1
G¯−G∗H
·
∂NH
∂α
+
( N¯ −NH(α)
(G¯−GH(α))2
)
·
∂GH
∂α
(18)
Substitution of (16) and (17) into (18) yields
sign
[d (N¯−N∗H (α))
(G¯−G∗
H
(α))
dα
]
= sign
[
γ′(GH) · qH −
(NH
GH
−
N¯ −NH
G¯−GH
)
·
NH
G2H
· c′′H(·)
]
(19)
If NH
GH
> N¯−NH
G¯−GH
, then
d
(N¯−N∗
H
(α))
(G¯−G∗
H
(α))
dα
< 0 and pg is lower in the market with
the greater α. On the other hand, if NH
GH
< N¯−NH
G¯−GH
, then pg is higher in the
market with the greater α for small γ′(GH)qH , but lower in the market with
the greater α for large γ′(GH)qH .
Using similar analysis it can be shown that if NH
GH
< N¯−NH
G¯−GH
, then
d
(N∗
H
(α))
(G∗
H
(α))
dα
>
0 and pg + pp is higher in the market with the higher α. These results are
summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In the welfare maximum, markets in which α is higher
have more high quality GPs and more patients allocated to high quality GPs
than markets in which α is lower. This welfare maximum can be imple-
mented by the purchaser setting pg = c
′
L
( N¯−N∗H (α)
G¯−G∗
H
(α)
)
and then letting the
market determine pp. If
NH
GH
< N¯−NH
G¯−GH
, then pg is lower in the market with
the greater α for large γ′(GH)qH . In this case, pg+pp is higher in the market
with the greater α and so pp is greater in the market with the greater α.
The result that pp is greater in the market where patients value high
quality more greatly is intuitive, but depends on the conditions given in
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Proposition 4. Therefore, although this market has more high quality GPs
and more patients serviced by high quality GPs, the price patients pay for
these high quality services may not be greater than in the market where
high quality is valued less by patients.
Savage and Jones (2004) found that in Australia the bulk billing rate
(the proportion of patients with pp = 0) falls as local market average in-
come increases. With the interpretation that local markets with higher
average income have a higher average preference for high quality this result
is consistent with Proposition 4, where an increase in α leads to an increase
in N∗H .
In general, to implement the welfare maximum in Proposition 4, the
purchaser needs to set a different pg in each market. However, in practice,
purchasers usually set the same pg in all markets independent of the dis-
tribution of preferences in those markets.8 This means that in some local
markets it will be set too low and in other markets it will be too high relative
to the welfare maximum. As discussed in Section 5.1, this does not create a
problem in markets in which it is set too low, but in markets in which it is
set too high, low quality GPs have an incentive to over-service.
5.3 Two Conditions
The analysis of Section 4 is repeated for the case where patients can have
one of two conditions, 1 or 2. The number of patients with condition 1 is
N¯1 and with condition 2 is N¯2. Let qki k = 1, 2; i = H,L be the quality
of service provided by a GP of quality i when the patient has condition k.
From the patients perspective, if they have condition 1, it is assumed that
seeing a high quality GP yields more utility than seeing a low quality GP,
8In Australia there is one bulk billing price pg.
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q1H > q
1
L. However, if they have condition 2, it is assumed that they get the
same utility from seeing a GP of high or low quality, q2H = q
2
L = q
2.9
Welfare Maximum: The welfare maximum involves all patients with
condition 2 being serviced by low quality GPs as low quality GPs provide
services at lower cost. In addition, the welfare maximum involves patients
with condition 1 being allocated between GPs so that the following is satis-
fied,
θ(N1H) · (q
1
H − q
1
L) = c
′
H
(N1H
G1H
)
− c′L
(N¯1 −N1H + N¯2
G¯−G1H
)
. (20)
This is very similar to (7) above. Patients with condition 1 are allocated be-
tween GPs so that the extra marginal benefit of allocating one more patient
to a high quality GP, θ(N1H) · (q
1
H − q
1
L), is equal to the extra marginal cost
of doing so, c′H
(N1
H
G1
H
)
− c′L
( N¯1−N1
H
+N¯2
G¯−G1
H
)
. Let the solution to (20) be given
by N1∗H . Patients with condition 1 and θ ≥ θ(N
1∗
H ) see high quality GPs,
patients with condition 1 and θ < θ(N1∗H ) and all patients with condition 2
see low quality GPs. With appropriate amendments a condition similar to
(8) determines the welfare maximising allocation of GPs between high and
low quality
Proposition 1 is easily extended to the case of two conditions in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5: If the government purchaser sets pg = c
′
L
( N¯1−N1
H
+N¯2
G¯−G1
H
)
,
then market determination of pp = θ(N
1∗
H ) · (q
1
H − q
1
L) yields the welfare
maximising allocation of patients between GPs and the welfare maximising
allocation of GPs between high and low quality.
Balance billing with two conditions has interesting implications. With
9Condition 2 might be a condition the patient regularly suffers from and goes to a GP
to get a prescription for a pharmaceutical. In this case, from the patients perspective, it
does not matter whether a high or low quality GP writes the prescription.
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the optimal pg given in Proposition 5, a patient with θ ≥ θ(N
1∗
H ) and condi-
tion 1 chooses to be treated by a high quality GP while the same individual
with condition 2 chooses to be treated by a low quality GP. The welfare
maximum has the same patient being treated by different quality GPs de-
pending on the condition they have. Given patient histories are important
in correctly diagnosing and treating patients and given the welfare maxi-
mum has patients being served by different GPs depending on condition, it
is important that patient histories are available to all GPs.
6 Payment by Capitation
Under payment by capitation GPs receive a fixed payment, kg, for each
patient registered with them. This payment is made by the government
purchaser. Once a patient is registered with a GP all primary healthcare
services are provided by this GP. In addition, it is assumed that GPs can
charge patients a price, kp, per-service delivered. In this section, the case
where kp > 0 will be referred to as capitation coupled with balance billing.
It is assumed that patients register with GPs before they know whether
they have a medical condition. The total number of patients is Nˆ . A
proportion φ of these are assumed to have the same medical condition.
Therefore, there are N¯ = φ · Nˆ patients who need treatment.
Given N¯ , the welfare maximising allocation of GPs between high and
low quality and of patients between high and low quality GPs is given in
Section 3 above as the solution to (7) and (8).
6.1 Equilibrium Determination of kp
Given GH , NˆH patients demand to be registered with high quality GPs if
θ(NˆH) · (qH − qL) = kp. High quality GPs choose the number of patients
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to register, nˆH , to maximise income yH = kg · nˆH + kp · φ · nˆH − cH(φnˆH),
where kgnˆH is income from capitation and kp · φ · nˆH − cH(φnˆH) is income
from providing services to φnˆH sick patients. Income maximisation leads to
the condition kg + φkp = φ · c
′
H(φ · nˆH). Since nˆH =
NˆH
GH
, this condition can
be written in terms of NˆH as kg + φkp = φ · c
′
H(
φ·NˆH
GH
). Equating demand
and supply of registrations yields
θ(NˆH) · (qH − qL) = c
′
H(
φ · NˆH
GH
)−
kg
φ
. (21)
Condition (21) is solved for NˆkH and k
k
p = θ(Nˆ
k
H) · (qH − qL). In equilibrium,
patients with preference parameters in [θ(NˆkH), θ] register with high quality
GPs and pay kkp for high quality GP services.
6.2 Determination of kg
In equilibrium, the utility of the marginal GP is the same whether high or
low quality is chosen, that is,
kg · nˆL − cL(φnˆL) = kg · nˆH + kp · φ · nˆH − ch(φnˆH) + γ(GH) · qH (22)
Using the income maximisation condition, this can be written as
kg · nˆL − cL(φnˆL) = c
′
H(
φNˆH
GH
) · (
φNˆH
GH
)− ch(
φNˆH
GH
) + γ(GH) · qH (23)
Given, pg and NˆH + NˆL = Nˆ , (21) and (23) are solved for the equilibrium
number of patients registered with high quality GPs, NˆH , and the equilib-
rium number of high quality GPs, GˆH .
In the following proposition it is assumed that θ(NˆH) drawn from the
entire population of patients, Nˆ , is the same as θ(φNˆH) drawn from the
population of patients that actually have the condition, φNˆ .10
10Assumimg all patients that are registered with high quality GPs are equally likely to
fall sick this is approximately true for large NˆH .
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Proposition 6: If the government purchaser sets kg = φc
′
L
(φ(Nˆ−Nˆ∗H )
G¯−G∗
H
)
,
where φNˆ∗H = N
∗
H , then market determination of kp yields the welfare max-
imising allocation of patients between GPs and the welfare maximising allo-
cation of GPs between high and low quality.
The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1.
The optimal government capitation payment kg = φc
′
L
(φ(Nˆ−Nˆ∗H )
G¯−G∗
H
)
when
coupled with market determination of the fee-for-service, kp, duplicates the
welfare maximum. This is not surprising because with patients only having
one condition a capitation payment is like a fee-for-service and Proposition
1 established that fee-for-service with pg optimally chosen duplicated the
welfare maximum. Even if patients can have many conditions, as long as
the difference in quality from seeing a high or low quality GPs is the same
for each condition, then Proposition 6 applies with φ scaled up to reflect
the proportion of the population with any condition.11 So fee-for-service or
a capitation payment, when coupled with balance billing, can achieve the
welfare maximising allocation of GPs between high and low quality and the
welfare maximising allocation of patients between GPs.
If patients have conditions for which the difference in quality from seeing
a high or low quality GP is different, then Proposition 5 applies and the
welfare maximum can be achieved by fee-for-service and balance billing.
However, it is no longer the case that fee-for-service and capitation are
equivalent. In the welfare maximum with two conditions, patients with
relatively high θ′s choose to be treated by a high quality GP for one condition
and a low quality GP for the other. Under capitation, patients register with
a GP and obtain all their treatment from that GP. They are not allowed
11φ maybe greater than 1. In this case, the number of conditions that require treatment
N¯ is greater than the number of patients, Nˆ .
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to seek treatment for different conditions from different GPs. Therefore,
in terms of the allocation of patients to GPs, fee-for-service coupled with
balance billing is superior to capitation coupled with balance billing.
In Section 5.1 above, it was argued that if pg is set too high relative to
its welfare maximising level, then low quality GPs are rationed and have an
incentive to over-service. As the information required to set pg optimally
is difficult for the purchaser to obtain it is possible that pg might be set
too high. This is a problem for fee-for-service. However, under capitation
low quality GPs do not have an incentive to over-service if the capitation
payment is set too high relative to its welfare maximising level as GP income
does not depend on the number of services delivered.
In summary, fee-for-service with pg optimally chosen duplicates the wel-
fare maximum even if patients have many conditions and the difference
between high and low quality varies from condition to condition. This is
not true for capitation payments as patients can not seek treatment from
different GPs conditional on the condition they have. However, if pg and
kg are set too high relative to the welfare maximum, then fee-for-service
provides an incentive for low quality GPs to over-service while a capitation
payment does not. Which payment scheme is best from the point of view
of the purchaser depends on whether pg is optimally chosen, if it is, then
fee-for-service with balance billing is superior to capitation with balance
billing.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, in an environment where GPs are of differing quality and
heterogeneous patients have different preferences for quality, it is shown that
fee-for-service coupled with balance billing or capitation payments coupled
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with balance billing are superior GP payment schemes than fee-for-service
or capitation payments alone. This is because both achieve the welfare
maximising allocation of GPs between high and low quality and the welfare
maximising allocation of patients between GPs. To some extent this is
not surprising as without balance billing there are two objectives and only
one instrument. The policy implication is clear, balance billing should be
allowed as it promotes an efficient allocation of GPs and patients. Balance
billing in not allowed in the United States. It is allowed in Australia, though
recently GPs have been given incentives to increase the bulk billing rate and
so reduce the prevalence of balance billing, Savage and Jones (2004).
Where patients have more than one condition it is shown that fee-for-
service coupled with balance billing is superior to capitation payments even
when coupled with balance billing as fee-for-service allows patients to seek
treatment from GPs of differing quality conditional on the condition they
have. This is not possible under capitation payments. However, a payment
system that encourages patients to seek treatment from different GPs con-
ditional on condition does require a system of centralized patient records to
ensure treatment is consistent with patients’ medical histories.
The model of the paper has been framed in terms of GPs of different
quality. However, a natural reinterpretation of the model has nurse practi-
tioners replacing low quality GPs and GPs providing the high quality service.
In this setting, GPs balance bill and nurse practitioners do not. If a patient
has a condition for which quality matters then they seek treatment from
GPs, if not, then they seek treatment from nurse practitioners. Similarly,
GPs could be viewed as low quality and specialists as high quality. Patients
seek treatment from GPs for minor conditions and are not balance billed
but seek treatment from specialist for serious conditions and are balanced
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billed.
Finally it is shown that the purchaser choice of the fee is crucial in terms
of the incentives it provides to over-servicing. If it is set too high, low quality
GPs are rationed and have an incentive to over-service. This is not so with
capitation payments. Therefore, the superiority of fee-for-service coupled
with balance billing over capitation payments coupled with balance billing
depends very much on the fee being chosen optimally.
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9 Appendix
Second Order Conditions for Welfare Maximum:
∂2W
∂N2H
= θ′(NH) · (qH − qL)−
c′′H(·)
GH
−
c′′L(·)
G¯−GH
< 0 (A-1)
∂2W
∂G2H
= γ′(GH) · qH −
N2H
G3H
· c′′H(·)−
(N¯ −NH)
2
(G¯−GH)3
· c′′L(·) < 0 (A-2)
∂2W
∂N2H
·
∂2W
∂G2H
− (
∂2W
∂GH∂NH
)2 > 0 (A-3)
Conditions (A-1) and (A-2) hold because θ′(NH) < 0, c
′′
H > 0, c
′′
L > 0
and γ′(GH) < 0. Condition (A-3) is assumed to hold.
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